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Loyola High School v. Attorney
General of Quebec: On Non-triviality
and the Charter Value of
Religious Freedom
Howard Kislowicz*

I. INTRODUCTION
From one perspective, Quebec’s Ethics and Religious Culture Program
(“ERCP”), at issue in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General),1
is far-reaching. It is mandatory teaching for primary and secondary
students in all educational institutions — public or private, confessional or
non-confessional. On the interpretation of the Home School Legal Defence
Association of Canada, parents cannot even avoid the ERCP by educating
their children at home.2 The only way out of the ERCP is to seek an
exemption from the Minister of Education, Recreation and Sports, either at
the individual or institutional level. However, the ERCP is a two-credit
course, and schools are free to create an additional course of up to four
credits without ministerial approval. Though schools are required to
educate about religion in accordance with the ministerial dictates
of neutrality and objectivity in the context of the ERCP, they can be
non-neutral in a course offered for twice as many classroom hours.
Parents seeking an individual exemption from the ERCP were rebuffed
in a ministerial decision upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”)

*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick. Large thanks to Audrey
Macklin for helpful discussions in the preparation of this article, to Kathryn Chan, Kate Glover and an
anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier drafts, and to Geneva McSheffery for able research
assistance. This article was enriched through a discussion at the Osgoode Hall Law School 2014
Constitutional Cases Conference and I thank Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin Berger for including me in
that program. Special thanks to Dr. Naomi Lear and Gabriel Kislowicz. Mistakes are mine.
1
[2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola”].
2
Id. (Factum of the Home School Legal Defence Association of Canada, at paras. 3-4);
Education Act, CQLR, c. I-13.3, s. 15(4).
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in L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes.3 The Court found that the
parents had failed to demonstrate how being exposed to neutral, objective
presentations of religious cultures and ethical systems interfered with their
or their child’s religious freedom. Loyola presented the more difficult issue
of whether the government could require a Catholic educational institution
to teach about religion and culture in a “neutral” way.
This article takes Loyola as an opportunity to examine two ways that
courts have justified limits on religious freedom. First, I interrogate an
under-examined aspect of the law of religious freedom: the requirement
that claimants prove the interference with their religious freedom is “more
than trivial or insubstantial” (Part IV). Second, I examine how the majority
and minority decisions articulate broader visions of religious freedom.
I argue that religious freedom has been interpreted through the value of
tolerance, understood in Loyola as giving rise to a state obligation to
educate students in the skills of non-exclusionary dialogue (Part V). Before
entering into these analyses, I provide some historical and legislative
context (Part II), and a summary of the SCC’s decision (Part III).

II. LEGISLATIVE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The ERCP is the most recent step in Quebec’s legislative effort to
secularize its education system. The 1867 constitutional compromise
entrenched whatever denominational schools existed in each province at
the time of union.4 This left schools in Quebec divided along religious
lines, with Catholic and Protestant Committees of the Council of Public
Instruction in charge of “their respective schools with little or no
government interference”.5
In the 1960s, a growing appetite for societal change focused in part
on public education. The government established a new Ministry of
Education in 1964. It replaced the Council of Public Instruction with the
Superior Council of Education. This body, comprising a Catholic and
Protestant Committee, set the curricula for religious education in Quebec
schools. This “resulted in a loss of influence of the Catholic Church” as

[2012] S.C.J. No. 7, 2012 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “des Chênes”].
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 93.
5
Spencer Boudreau, “From Confessional to Cultural: Religious Education in the Schools
of Québec” (2011) 38:3 Religion & Education 212, at 213 [hereinafter “Boudreau”].
3
4
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the standardization of education “shifted authority away from local
boards and the Church and centralized it in the Ministry of Education”.6
In the 1990s, efforts to deconfessionalize7 Quebec’s school boards
gained more momentum. This was made constitutionally possible by a
1997 amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867, releasing Quebec from its
previous obligation to maintain denominational schools.8 In 1998, Quebec
replaced its denominational school boards with linguistic boards, and
deconfessionalized all public schools in 2000.9 Parents were still, however,
allowed the choice between Catholic, Protestant, and nonreligious Moral
curricula for their children; they could, alternatively, take an exemption
from all such programs.10
The next step was the 2005 modification of section 41 of Quebec’s
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,11 which had previously given
parents the right to “require that, in the public educational establishments,
their children receive a religious or moral education in conformity with
their convictions, within the framework of the curricula provided for by
law”.12 Under the new version, parents have “a right to give their children
a religious and moral education in keeping with their convictions and with
proper regard for their children’s rights and interests”.13 This cleared a
legal obstacle for the development of a single curriculum regarding
religion and ethics to be implemented throughout the province, which the
government formally put into place in 2008 with the ERCP.14 The ERCP’s
main objectives are “‘the recognition of others’ and the ‘pursuit of the
common good’”.15 To these ends, it seeks to develop three competencies in
students: reflection on ethical questions, understanding the phenomenon of
religion and engagement in dialogue.16

6

Id.
This term refers to the change from religiously based school boards (Protestant and
Catholic) to linguistically based school boards (English and French).
8
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 93A.
9
Lucille Otero & David Burgee, “Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Québec Schools”
(2011) 21 Educ. & L.J. 63, at 65.
10
Id.
11
CQLR, c. C-12.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Lorna M.A. Bowman, “Freedom of Religion and Publicly Funded Religious Schools in
Canada” in Stephen Parker, Rob Freathy & Leslie J. Francis, eds., Religious Education and Freedom
of Religious Belief (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012) 29, at 39.
15
Loyola, supra, note 1, at para. 11.
16
Boudreau, supra, note 5, at 220.
7
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The ERCP is treated the same as any other required course in the
public and private educational systems. The Minister has the power to set
compulsory subjects,17 and private schools are required to use the
educational materials designated by the Minister.18 However, a private
school can be exempted from a mandatory course when it “dispenses
programs of studies which the Minister of Education, Recreation and
Sports judges equivalent”.19
Everything turned, in Loyola, on the definition of “equivalent”. When
Loyola, a private Catholic high school, applied for an exemption, the
Minister denied that application because the Minister viewed Loyola’s
approach to the ERCP as confessional, not neutral and objective, and
therefore not “equivalent”. Loyola successfully sought judicial review at
the Quebec Superior Court, but the Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously
overturned that decision.

III. THE SCC’S DECISION
The SCC was unanimous in allowing Loyola’s appeal, though the
Court divided on the appropriate remedy. The majority applied the
analytical framework developed in Doré,20 which applies a reasonableness
standard of review to administrative decisions that engage Charter21
values. However, Abella J. held that “where Charter rights are engaged,
reasonableness requires proportionality”,22 and a “proportionate balancing
is one that gives effect, as fully as possible to the Charter protections at
stake given the particular statutory mandate”.23 Accordingly, the Minister’s
decision in this case was required to reflect a “proportionate balance”
between the statutory goals and the fullest possible protection of religious
freedom.24
On the substance, Abella J. held that the central question in the appeal
was how to balance the protection of religious freedom and the “values of
17
18
19

An Act Respecting Private Education, CQLR, c E-9.1, s. 25.
Id., s. 35.
Regulation respecting the application of the Act respecting private education, CQLR, c. E-9.1,

r. 1, s. 22.
20

Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Doré”].
21
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
22
Loyola, supra, note 1, at para. 38.
23
Id., at para. 39.
24
Id., at para. 32.
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a secular state”.25 She held that secularism, properly understood, requires
“respect for religious differences”.26 However, state action designed to
further the values of “equality, human rights and democracy” can
legitimately limit religious freedom.27 In the Loyola context, this meant
that the state could justifiably try to ensure that “students in all schools are
capable, as adults, of conducting themselves with openness and respect as
they confront cultural and religious differences”,28 even where this might
limit religious freedom.
Applying this understanding of the various values at stake, Abella J.
turned her attention to the provision in the Regulation that requires the
Minister to grant an exemption from a mandatory program where the
school offers an “equivalent” program. Justice Abella held that the
Minister’s interpretation of “equivalent” was unreasonable because it
failed to proportionately balance the values of religious freedom against
the statutory objectives. According to Abella J., the Minister sought
too close a match between the ERCP and Loyola’s proposed alternative.
The regulatory scheme assumes the continued existence of private
denominational schools. In such an environment, “it is unreasonable to
interpret equivalence as requiring a strict adherence to specific course
content, rather than in terms of the ERC’s program objectives generally”.29
The Minister’s decision effectively prohibited Loyola from teaching
Catholic religion and ethics from a Catholic perspective, which impacted
Loyola as an institution and interfered with parents’ rights to transmit their
faith to their children. Further, the Attorney General of Quebec had failed
to adequately demonstrate how requiring Loyola to teach about
Catholicism from a neutral standpoint furthered the legislative objectives
of encouraging respect and openness to others.30 This amounted to a
disproportionate balancing of the Charter values against the statutory
objectives. In Abella J.’s view, however, requiring Loyola to teach about
non-Catholic religions and ethical systems in a “neutral, historical and
phenomenological way” would not have been disproportionate.31 Indeed,
such a curricular requirement would not even be considered an
infringement of religious freedom.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id., at para. 43.
Id.
Id., at para. 47.
Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 56.
Id., at paras. 68-69.
Id., at para. 71.

336

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

At the same time, Abella J. acknowledged that, in real classrooms,
questions may arise that challenge the distinction between the school’s
own religion, which it must be allowed to teach in a non-neutral way, and
other religions or ethical perspectives, which it can be required to teach
objectively. In such situations, a “comparative approach that explains the
Catholic ethical perspective and responds to questions about it is of
course legitimate”.32 Teachers could bring a Catholic perspective into
such discussions, but the role of that perspective would be “one of
significant participant rather than hegemonic tutor”.33 In the result, the
majority remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration in light of
their reasons.
The minority opinion, authored by McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver J.,
differed from the majority opinion in three main respects. First, the
minority adopted a different method of analysis, at odds with the Court’s
holding in Doré. Instead of applying a reasonableness standard of review
and using a shortened proportionality analysis, the majority goes directly
to an analysis of the Charter infringement and its potential justification
under section 1. Second, the minority would have ordered a different
remedy, granting Loyola’s requested exemption without remitting the
decision to the Minister.34
Third, the minority held that the majority’s reasons would effectively
require Loyola to adopt a “secular perspective at all times, other than
during their discussion of the Catholic religion”.35 This, according to the
minority, would not fully protect Loyola’s36 religious freedom rights and
would be “unworkable in practice”.37 For the minority, Loyola’s teachers
should be able to bring Catholic perspectives to bear on ethical issues
and doctrines of non-Catholic religions, particularly those contrary to
Catholicism. Requiring teachers to remain silent on the Catholic

32

Id., at para. 73.
Id., at para. 76.
34
Id., at para. 165.
35
Id., at para. 154.
36
The minority also addressed the question of whether a legal person can hold the right of
religious freedom. The minority adopted two criteria for a religious organization to be able to assert
its rights to religious freedom. It must (1) be constituted primarily for religious purposes, and
(2) operate in accordance with those religious purposes. Once these have been established, courts
should evaluate the organization’s claim to ensure it is made in good faith. The majority held it
unnecessary to decide whether corporations enjoy the right of religious freedom because Loyola had
the right to seek judicial review in any event. Id., at paras. 99-101, 138. For a comparative
perspective, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. (2014).
37
Loyola, supra, note 1, at para. 154.
33
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perspective in these moments violates religious freedom and also limits
the ERC’s capacity to attain its stated objective of developing students’
competence in dialogue.38 Instead, the appropriate posture to demand of
teachers is one of “respect, tolerance and understanding”.39

IV. NON-TRIVIALITY
In order to make out a claim that government action infringes
religious freedom, a litigant must prove:
(1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a
nexus with religion, and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party
interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his
or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief. 40

In Loyola, the non-triviality element was highlighted when the Quebec
Court of Appeal held unanimously that any infringement of Loyola’s
religious freedom was trivial.41 The SCC disagreed, which provides an
impetus to reflect on what accounts for this difference, and, more broadly,
on what proves that interferences with religious practices or beliefs are
“more than trivial or insubstantial”. I suggest that the non-triviality
requirement demands more careful attention, as it stands in tension with
the highly subjective approach to proving the existence of a religious
belief or practice. Indeed, in a recent decision of the Ontario Superior
Court, Durno J. casts some doubt on the clarity of the concept:
The cases … do not specify the manner in which the not trivial or
insubstantial test is to be applied. While it appears that there may be a
reasonableness assessment when determining whether the claimant has
met the [triviality] branch, it is a very low threshold given that s. 2(a)
protects beliefs in an almost limitless manner. 42

The “non-triviality” requirement can be traced to the 1986 decision of
R. v. Jones.43 Mr. Jones had objected to a requirement under Alberta’s
School Act that he seek an exemption from sending his children to public
38

Id., at para. 159.
Id., at para. 162.
40
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, at para. 34,
2006 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added); Loyola, supra, note 1, at para. 134.
41
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Loyola High School, [2012] Q.J. No. 15094, at paras. 173-174,
2012 QCCA 2139 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Loyola High School”].
42
R. v. Purewal, [2014] O.J. No. 2824, at para. 197, 2014 ONSC 2198 (Ont. S.C.J.).
43
[1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jones”].
39
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school if he wished to educate them at home. Justice Wilson found that
any infringement was trivial, and that “[l]egislative or administrative action
whose effect on religion is trivial or insubstantial is not … a breach of
freedom of religion.”44 Though Wilson J. wrote in dissent, this particular
holding attracted majority support.45
The SCC has since referred consistently to the non-triviality
requirement,46 and explained that “‘[t]rivial or insubstantial’ interference is
interference that does not threaten actual religious beliefs or conduct”.47
This elaboration, however, may only delay the analytical difficulty. In the
face of a claimant’s argument that their religious beliefs or conduct are
“threatened”, on what basis is a court to hold otherwise? Presumably, a
claimant who, sincere in her or his beliefs, undertakes litigation with all its
associated costs, believes the infringement to be more than trivial. If a
court disagrees, by what standard is it to determine triviality? Earlier case
law suggests that a reasonableness-based analysis will be applied. Chief
Justice Dickson held in Edwards Books that “[t]he Constitution shelters
individuals and groups only to the extent that religious beliefs or conduct
might reasonably or actually be threatened.”48 Chief Justice Dickson’s
example of a trivial infringement was “a taxation act that imposed a
modest sales tax extending to all products, including those used in the
course of religious worship”.49 He reasoned that while such legislation
would impose a small cost on the worshipper, the Charter should not offer
protection from this type of trivial burden.
Putting the non-triviality component back in context of the overall
section 2(a) infringement analysis, I suggest that there are actually two
layers of reasonableness at play. First, a claimant must demonstrate that
there is some objective interference with a religious practice,50 i.e., that it
is not only the claimant who can recognize the problem. Second, the
claimant must show the interference is non-trivial, which also
incorporates a notion of reasonableness.
44

Id., at 314 (Wilson J.).
Id., at 308 (McIntyre J.).
46
See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713,
at 759 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards Books”]; Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46,
at para. 58, 2004 SCC 47, at para. 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards Amselem”]; Multani v. Commission
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, supra, note 40, at para. 34.
47
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, at para. 32, 2009
SCC 37 (S.C.C.).
48
Edwards Books, supra, note 46, at 759 (emphasis added).
49
Id.
50
des Chênes, supra, note 3, at para. 2.
45

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

339

But all this still does not fully answer the question of how to
distinguish the trivial from the non-trivial. In Loyola, for example, the
Court of Appeal articulated two reasons why the Minister’s decision to
deny Loyola an exemption from the ERCP was, if anything, a trivial
infringement of religious freedom. First, the ERCP was only one course
among many, and second, the curriculum did not require teachers to
refute Catholic precepts, but only to refrain from expressing their own
views.51 In contrast, the majority of the SCC held that a curriculum
dictating how a Catholic school discusses Catholicism has a “serious
impact on religious freedom”.52 Similarly, the minority articulates its
departure from the Court of Appeal by explaining that requiring teachers
to remain “mum … in the face of ethical positions that do not accord
with the Catholic faith” would coerce teachers “into adopting a false and
facile posture of neutrality”.53 On either version, observers are offered
little guidance in Loyola for locating the boundary between the trivial
and the non-trivial. There are, however, some lower court decisions that
may offer some direction.
Courts have sometimes used the notion of triviality as a way to focus
on whether the activity at the centre of the litigation had a religious
purpose. In R. v. Welsh,54 for example, the Court assessed whether a
police undercover operation, in which an officer posing as an Obeah55
spiritual advisor obtained incriminating statements, infringed the
accused’s religious freedom. Despite the Crown’s concession on the
accused’s sincere belief,56 the Court held that any interference with
the accused’s religious freedom was trivial or insubstantial. The Court
based this conclusion, principally, on the absence of evidence “that either
appellant communicated with [the undercover officer] to satisfy or fulfill
some spiritual need or purpose”.57
Echoes of this reasoning can be found in the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s decision that the requirement for new Canadian citizens to
swear an oath to the Queen did not violate religious or conscientious

51

Loyola High School, supra, note 41, at para. 174.
Loyola, supra, note 1, at para. 62.
53
Id., at paras. 155-156.
54
[2013] O.J. No. 1462, 2013 ONCA 190 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Welsh”].
55
The Court held that “Obeah describes a system of spiritual and mystical beliefs practiced
in Jamaica and other black communities of the West Indies.” Id., at para. 21.
56
Id., at para. 56.
57
Id., at paras. 70-71.
52
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freedom because the oath itself has no religious purpose.58 Similarly,
when faced with a turban-wearing Sikh motorcyclist’s argument for a
religious exemption from a helmet law, the Ontario Court of Justice
found that motorcycling is not a religious activity and “the burden of
simply not being able to operate a motorcycle is clearly trivial and
insubstantial”.59 The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench responded to a
religious freedom challenge to a municipal ban on amplification systems
in city parks in like manner. The Court reasoned that, though the
claimant could not use his preferred method of preaching to the
homeless, the ban did not impair his ability to preach.60
The Federal Court of Appeal relied on the notion of triviality in a
somewhat different way. A Jewish man argued that the government’s
refusal to list his birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel” in his passport
interfered with his religious belief that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.61
The Court did not impugn the sincerity of the claimant’s belief. Instead,
it held that the government’s policy not to list any state after “Jerusalem”
on passports did not interfere with the claimant’s ability to believe,
declare, and disseminate his religious views, and did not “impose an
expression of religious identity which is not true to [the claimant]”.62
Accordingly, the policy’s effects were “negligible”,63 because the belief,
practice, and identity-based aspects of religious freedom rights were not
sufficiently engaged.
Other findings of triviality relate to land uses. Courts have adopted
the view that an otherwise legal use of land by another can only amount
to a trivial interference with religious freedom.64 Similarly, when a
58
McAteer v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 3728, at paras. 119-120, 2014
ONCA 578 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 444 (S.C.C.). This finding is
arguably troubling as its focus on the intention of the oath rather than the effect on the litigant removes
subjectivity out of the equation. See Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism and
Citizenship), [1994] F.C.J. No. 33, [1994] 2 F.C.R. 406, at 428 (F.C.A.); Léonid Sirota, “True
Allegiance: The Citizenship Oath and the Charter” (2014) 33:2 N.J.C.L. 137; See also Chainnigh v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 53, 2008 FC 69 (F.C.).
59
R. v. Badesha, [2011] O.J. No. 2564, at para. 68, 2011 ONCJ 284 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter
“Badesha”]; but see Dhillon v. British Columbia (Ministry of Transportation and Highways, Motor
Vehicle Branch), [1999] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 25, 35 C.H.R.R. D/293 (B.C.H.R.T.) for an opposite result.
60
R. v. Pawlowski, [2011] A.J. No. 189, 2011 ABQB 93 (Alta. Q.B.), affd [2014] A.J. No. 394,
310 C.C.C. (3d) 349 (Alta. C.A.).
61
Veffer v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [2007] F.C.J. No. 908, 2007 FCA 247
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 457 (S.C.C.).
62
Id., at para. 33.
63
Id., at para. 33.
64
Residents for Sustainable Development in Guelph v. 6 & 7 Developments Ltd., [2005]
O.J. No. 1158, 129 C.R.R. (2d) 173 (Ont. S.C.J.): the Ontario Superior Court upheld a finding of the
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church was prohibited by a city zoning decision from operating a shelter
in the church, the Court found the infringement to be trivial because
there were parts of the city where the church might have legally operated
a shelter.65
The Quebec Court of Appeal made a triviality finding in Saguenay
(Ville de) v. Mouvement laïque québécois66 that may shed additional light
on the notion. One part of the claim was that a city’s practice of opening
town council meetings with a non-denominational prayer addressed to
“Dieu tout puissant” (almighty God) was an infringement of freedom of
conscience and religion.67 For present purposes, the pertinent issue is that
the Court of Appeal held the prayer to be, if anything, a trivial or
insubstantial interference with the conscientious freedom rights of a nonreligious citizen. The SCC disagreed, finding an impairment of the “right
to full and equal exercise of … freedom of conscience and religion”.68 The
reasoning supporting the Court of Appeal’s triviality finding was that the
prayer only lasts some 20 seconds, and that the evidence presented did not
show the claimant to be particularly sensitive or even particularly troubled
by the prayer.69 In response to the litigant’s claim of discrimination, the
Court of Appeal held that a “reasonable person, dispassionate and fully
apprised of the circumstances, possessed of similar attributes to, and under

Ontario Municipal Board that any impact on a Jesuit spiritual retreat centre by the otherwise lawful
development of a Walmart was trivial and insubstantial. The Divisional Court granted leave to
appeal, but the appeal was never decided. See also Cham Shan Temple v. Ontario (Ministry of the
Environment), [2015] O.E.R.T.D. No. 9. In Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and
Natural Resource Operations), [2014] B.C.J. No. 584, at para. 296, 2014 BCSC 568 (B.C.S.C.), affd
[2015] B.C.J. No. 1682, 2015 BCCA 352 (B.C.C.A.), the British Columbia Supreme Court held that
s. 2(a) could not be relied upon to restrict “the otherwise lawful use of land, on the basis that such
action would result in a loss of meaning to religious practices carried out elsewhere.”
65
Sarnia (City) v. River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia (Trustees of), [2014]
O.J. No. 2193, at paras. 20-24, 2014 ONSC 1572 (Ont. S.C.J.), revd on other grounds [2015] O.J.
No. 3527, 2015 ONCA 494 (Ont. C.A.).
66
[2013] Q.J. No. 5220, 2013 QCCA 936 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Saguenay”].
67
The case also included discussion of the presence of religious symbols — a crucifix and a
statue of the Sacred Heart — in council chambers, but the SCC found the Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction on these issues as no investigation had been undertaken by the Human Rights
Commission: Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 16, at para. 61,
2015 SCC 16 (S.C.C.).
68
Id., at para. 64.
69
Id., at para. 115. See also Allen v. Renfrew (County), [2004] O.J. No. 1231, 69 O.R. (3d)
742 (Ont. S.C.J.); but see Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), [1999] O.J. No. 3524, 47 O.R. (3d)
301 (Ont. C.A.) where the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at the opening of town council meetings
was held an unconstitutional violation of religious freedom.

342

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

similar circumstances as [the claimant]”70 would not have found any
detriment to the claimant. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning on discrimination
echoes the underlying message of its reasoning on religious freedom: a
reasonable person would have found these matters to be trivial. In the
Court’s view, the claimant’s own evidence supported the interpretation that
he was simply uncomfortable, and not sufficiently aggrieved to have the
benefit of the Charter’s (Canada’s or Quebec’s) protection.
In sum, with the exception of Welsh71 where the accused’s argument
can perhaps be explained as an attempt to evade punishment,72 the
common message of the above cases is: even if the claimants’ religious
beliefs were sincere, the impugned state action should not have bothered
them so much. The usually unarticulated standard by which this is
measured is reasonableness.
The trouble is that the reasons set out in Amselem in favour of a
subjective approach to the proof of religious practices counsel against
allowing this kind of reasonableness standard to enter the triviality
analysis. Religious commitments are assessed subjectively because
section 2(a)’s purpose is to protect individual choice.73 Further, courts
should not attempt to distinguish mandatory from voluntary religious
practices because “the State is in no position to be, nor should it become,
the arbiter of religious dogma”.74 If courts are to be restricted to sincerity
when evaluating the existence or the nature of the religious practice,
what justifies a shift to reasonableness when assessing how bothered a
particular claimant should have been? If courts do not have the
institutional capacity or legitimacy to assess the intensity of a religious
obligation, what changes when courts shift to assessing the intensity of
upset caused by an interference with that obligation? It is certainly
understandable that courts want to prevent the Charter from being
trivialized by capricious claims. But this can be accomplished by
ensuring that litigants meet the requirement set out in des Chênes of
“objectively” proving the infringement. This latter is best understood, in
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Saguenay, supra, note 66, at para. 136, citing Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, at para. 60, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).
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Supra, note 54.
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Even though Badesha, supra, note 59, involved a prosecution, the intervention of the
Ontario Human Rights Commission in favour of the accused suggests that something else is at play.
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But see Robert E. Charney, “How Can There Be Any Sin in Sincere? State Inquiries into
Sincerity of Religious Belief” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47 for an
argument for requiring some measure of objectivity in the analysis of religious practices.
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my view, as an obligation for litigants to make their practices intelligible
to judges, with judges being under a reciprocal obligation to seek
understanding across cultural barriers.75
An under-theorized understanding of triviality risks creating a
jurisprudence where “the large print giveth and the small print taketh
away”.76 Reliance on the notion of triviality risks masking, perhaps even
to judges themselves, moments when dominant expectations of what is a
“reasonable” interference with religious practice may undermine the
constitutional protection of religious and conscientious difference.77
Perhaps the more transparent way to limit religious freedom claims is
through a proportionality analysis, where courts are more practiced at
laying out explicitly all the countervailing considerations. The more
explicit the discussion is, the more likely are judges to uncover moments
when they have evaluated a religious freedom claim from their own
perspective rather than from the claimant’s. This opens up the question of
how the proportionality analysis was undertaken in the particular context
of Loyola, to which I now turn.

V. CHARTER VALUES AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Commentators have divided on the SCC’s approach to proportionality
analysis in the administrative context, with Doré’s apparent distinction
between Charter rights and values. Some have argued that the scope of a
value, as compared to a right, is uncertain in the abstract and raises
practical difficulties as regards who bears the onus of proof to justify
infringements.78 Related criticisms have attacked Charter values as either
an erosion of the Charter’s promise to the citizenry79 or as an ambiguous
75
For a deeper engagement with cross-cultural communication, see Howard Kislowicz,
“Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural Communication in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation”
(2014) 52:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 141; Benjamin L. Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance”
(2008) 21 Can. J.L. & Jur. 245.
76
Tom Waits, “Step Right Up” Small Change (1976).
77
Indeed, though the non-triviality requirement can be traced to Wilson J.’s opinion in Jones,
supra, note 43, Wilson J. herself later wrote, about freedom of association, that when “the Court is
placed in the position of having to choose between so-called meaningful and trivial constitutional
claims, an opening for the exercise of arbitrary line drawing has been created.” Lavigne v. Ontario
Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.R. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, at 262 (S.C.C.).
78
Christopher D. Bredt & Ewa Krajewska, “Doré: All that Glitters is Not Gold” in
J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 339.
79
Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion and the
Charter” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67
S.C.L.R. (2d) 561.
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limit on legislative action.80 Others have praised the jurisprudential
development as a way to provide “a broader and far more accessible way
to ensure the Charter’s relevance to the sphere of administrative justice.”81
How does Loyola respond to this commentary? As noted above, the
Court divided on methodology. The majority valorized Doré’s approach
while the minority ignored it. One might expect that precisely this
division would have elucidated the real differences between Doré’s
Charter values and the previous Oakes-as-usual approach (articulated in
Multani) to the Charter in administrative settings. However, the
disagreement between the majority and minority turned out not to stem
from any methodological difference, but rather from a divergence on
what proportionality required in the circumstances.82
Indeed, in Abella J.’s view, reasonableness requires proportionality.
Thus, to Matthew Lewans’ post-Doré question of whether “a conclusion
will be ipso facto reasonable as long as administrative decision-makers
formally acknowledge that policy objectives must be balanced against
Charter values”,83 the majority’s answer appears to be “no”. The kind of
deference courts are to show administrative decision-makers is effectively
the same as the kind of deference they are to show legislators in choosing
between constitutionally valid options.84
Perhaps stemming from this parallel, the majority and minority
judgments actually took similar approaches to proportionality from a
practical perspective, though they arrived at a somewhat different result.
Indeed, it is difficult to meaningfully distinguish between the minority’s
approach of applying a correctness standard that finds fault with the
Minister’s proportionality analysis and the majority’s approach of
adopting a reasonableness standard but equating reasonableness with
proportionality (understood as encompassing notions of minimal
impairment and the balancing of salutary and deleterious effects).
Matthew Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism” in
J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 361.
81
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Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391,
at 396.
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online: <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/03/19/reasonableness-proportionalityand-religious-freedom-loyola-high-school-v-quebec-attorney-general-2015-scc-12/>.
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80

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

345

The heart of the analysis is the same: the state action rises or falls on
proportionality. How, then, might we explain the majority’s insistence on
the importance of the method? Audrey Macklin suggests that this may
have to do with remedies.85 Under administrative law principles, courts
almost always remit the matter back to the decision-maker to render a
new decision in compliance with the reasons on judicial review. This is
precisely what the majority ordered. However, when courts are reviewing
government action through the lens of the Charter, the breadth of
remedies available under section 24(1) may give courts more confidence
to simply substitute their own decisions for the decision-maker’s, as the
minority would have done in this case. Alternatively, one might see the
concern with methodology as an expression of a practical concern for
how administrative decision-makers will go about their daily business.
The truncated proportionality analysis prescribed by Doré and the Loyola
majority may have been seen as more expedient or more accessible to
decision-makers.86
Yet another way to explain the methodological division in Loyola is that
the majority wanted to prevent courts from “‘retrying’ a range of
administrative decisions that would otherwise be subjected to a
reasonableness standard”87 while still allowing courts the option of
substituting their own views on Charter questions. By equating
reasonableness with “robust”88 proportionality, the general standard of
review remains reasonableness, which gets the special definition of
“proportionality” when it comes to Charter values. This may also be
understood as a response to the tension in the case law that constitutional
challenges to legislation undertaken in the administrative context are
reviewed on a correctness standard89 while constitutional challenges to the
application of legislation is reviewed on a reasonableness standard. If this is
the explanation, it seems like a compromise that may give rise to difficulties
in application. In any event, given that the Charter values side carried the

See Prof. Macklin’s comments in Daly, supra, note 82.
Macklin cautions that the “burgeoning legal scholarship and jurisprudence devoted to
describing, defending, refining and critiquing proportionality might suggest undue optimism on that
score” Macklin, supra, note 79, at 571.
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89
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’
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day in Loyola, it is sensible to ask which Charter values are at stake when
religious freedom interests are implicated by administrative decisions.
1. What Charter Values are Associated with Religious Freedom?
In unpacking the notion of Charter values, Sossin and Friedman ask
whether every Charter value must “derive only from one or more
particular rights or can [instead] flow from underlying Charter principles
that are not set out in specific rights such as human dignity”.90 It is
possible to see elements of both alternatives in Loyola. First, the majority
and minority judgments identify some values deriving from the
protection of religious freedom in the Charter. Second, the judgments can
be read as positing more general values associated with a diverse,
democratic, secular state. These values arguably underlie not only
religious freedom, but other Charter guarantees as well, such as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and equality.
With respect to the values deriving from religious freedom, both the
majority and minority emphasize the collective aspects of religious
experience. The majority refers to “the socially embedded nature of
religious belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its
manifestation through communal institutions and traditions”.91 The
minority similarly holds that the “communal character of religion means
that protecting the religious freedom of individuals requires protecting
the religious freedom of religious organizations, including religious
educational bodies such as Loyola”.92
Neither set of reasons is explicit about whether the protection of the
collective dimensions of religious freedom derives from the value of
religious freedom to the individual. The reasons may be read as
supporting the perspective that individuals need religious freedom to be
protected on a collective level in order to fully live out their individual
religious commitments. Alternatively, the holdings in Loyola are equally
consistent with the proposition that some religions have inherently
collective or communal aspects that are different in kind from the
individual autonomy-based reasons for protecting religious freedom. The

90
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citation by the majority of both Will Kymlicka and Dwight Newman,93
each of whom embraces one of these alternative perspectives, may be
read as a signal that the majority viewed both perspectives as leading to
the same legal result. On both theories, the law’s protection of collective
aspects of religious freedom remains crucial. In other words, the values
underpinning the protection of religious freedom require some
consideration of religion’s collective dimension. This indicates a
departure from the majority holding in Hutterian Brethren which, some
have argued (myself included), gave too short shrift to the collective
aspects of religious freedom.94
At the more general level, both judgments affirm the position that,
while a secular state has obligations to be neutral as between religions,95
it need not be neutral on all value-based matters. In the majority’s view,
“[t]he state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting
… core national values,” which include “equality, human rights and
democracy”.96 There are echoes here of the Court’s jurisprudence on
expressive freedom. In that context, the Court has held that laws cannot
advance a particular form of morality, but can be enacted “on the basis of
some fundamental conception of morality for the purposes of
safeguarding the values which are integral to a free and democratic
society”.97
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A crucial analytical step, of course, is differentiating between “core
national values” and other values. The divergence between the majority
and minority in Loyola can be explained in these terms. For the majority,
the provincial government has the capacity to require religious schools to
teach their students about other religions and ethical perspectives in a
neutral way in order to advance core national values of equality and
democracy. Both of these values require fostering tolerance for diverse
religions and perspectives. This is consistent with the Court’s vision in
Chamberlain,98 which interpreted a legislated requirement of secularism
in the public school system as allowing for the inclusion of religious
perspectives in the discussion of school curricula provided that the
religious perspectives were not exclusive of other perspectives. Loyola
represents a variation of this vision: the state can require religious schools
to be non-exclusive on religious and ethical content, up to the point that
the state’s policy effectively excludes the particular religious viewpoint of
the school. Interfering with how Loyola teaches Catholicism is a “core
values” problem because the Catholic perspective on Catholicism is
excluded. At the same time, a school’s refusal to teach about other
religious or ethical systems from a neutral perspective is a “core values”
problem because it fails to foster respect for outside perspectives.
For the minority, even requiring Loyola’s teachers to remain neutral
on ethical questions is too exclusive of the Catholic perspective. The
minority understands the requirement of inclusion as extending beyond
the formal discussion of religion and into the realm of morality more
generally. The minority’s example is compelling on this score. If a class
discussion involves the ethics of sexual intimacy outside of marriage, it
is quite realistic to expect students in a Catholic school to ask what the
Catholic teachings are on this question.99 What is a Catholic teacher to do
in such a circumstance? The minority says the effect of the majority’s
position is to prohibit the teacher from effectively bringing the Catholic
perspective into the dialogue.
One wonders, however, what the minority’s view would be where a
religious position is more at odds with other Charter provisions or with the
value of non-exclusionary dialogue. What if the ethical question is about
same-sex relationships or marriage?100 Would requiring Catholic teachers
98
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to remain neutral on this question be seen in the same light as sex outside
marriage, given the “core national value” of equality? Or, more
hypothetically, given the goals of educating about religious diversity and
fostering dialogue, it would seem reasonable and largely uncontroversial
for the ERCP to mandate field trips to a variety of religious centres.
However, some Orthodox Jews see entering certain places of worship,
particularly where deities are visually represented, as religiously
forbidden.101 Such a religious belief, while sincerely held, may be seen as
in tension with a goal of maximizing understanding or dialogue.
How do Charter values help us resolve these challenges? Perhaps
they do not in any obvious way. As Berger notes, “[t]he adjudicative
challenge and ethical demands posed are intrinsic to the constitutional
protection of religion … It can never be wholly avoided.”102 Whether in
the context of Charter values or rights, at some point the decision must
be made, and there will be cases where, “[e]ven if the state seeks to avoid
passing judgment … on the truth or falsity of a spiritual belief, it must
sometimes pursue goals that are inconsistent with particular religious
practices or values.”103 One wonders if Loyola’s claim would have been
as successful if it had insisted on a more controversial view or its rights
to keep its students insulated from ideas and debates it thought
harmful.104 On this score, it is worth recalling that Loyola’s victory was
not complete, as the majority did not accept Loyola’s claim with respect
to the ethics component of the ERPC. It remains to be seen how this will
affect the members of Loyola’s community.105
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The majority’s overall vision of a secular society’s education system
might be brought into sharper focus by reading Loyola together with des
Chênes. In that case,106 the SCC held that parents of a child in a public
school had not established that the ERCP gave rise to an objective
infringement of their religious freedom rights. This is perhaps confusing,
as the majority in Loyola identifies parents’ ability to transmit their faith
to their children as part of the religious freedom right. The majority’s
main justification for this difference in result is that, in Loyola, the ERCP
amounted to an infringement “not because it requires neutral discussion
of other faiths and ethical systems, but because it prevents a Catholic
discussion of Catholicism”.107
The combined effect seems to be this: when parents choose to
educate their children in a confessional manner, the state cannot dictate
the terms of that education. So, the government cannot tell parents how
to discuss their faith at home with their children, and can likewise not tell
a religious school how to educate about its own religion. On the other
hand, the state can require that all students be exposed to “neutral”
discussions of religion and ethics, and public schools will provide only
such discussion. This leaves room for religious schools to train students
in particularistic forms of reasoning through ethical dilemmas,108 which
enriches societal debates by increasing available perspectives.109 At the
same time, it insists on the state’s obligation to attempt to ensure that all
children are equipped with the skills of encountering one another through
respectful dialogue. While this may achieve a fair balance, we should not
overlook that the extent of parents’ control over how their faith is taught
to their children has an economic component. Where parents can afford
private education, or where a school’s community has sufficient
resources to subsidize those in need, the extent to which freedom of
religion can be enjoyed is greater.

at paras. 6, 69. It would be hard to believe the Court would entertain the notion that the province
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Charter value of religious freedom and the more specific notion
of non-triviality are both attempts to work out the terms on which
religious individuals and communities can demand that the state
recognize and take into account their differences. I have argued that the
jurisprudence on non-triviality is under-theorized. This obscures the basis
on which courts assess triviality, and risks undercutting the subjective
analysis undertaken with respect to a claimant’s sincere religious belief.
In contrast, though the distinction between Charter values and rights
remains elusive, the Court took some care in Loyola to work out the
balance between what autonomous space religious individuals and
communities can legitimately demand from the state and what the state
can legitimately demand of them.

